I downloaded the Visual Studio 2015 With Update 3 iso from MSDN Subscriber downloads. During installation I get the following errors: 'Error 0x8007010a: Failed authenticode verification of payload: c: Visual Studio 2015 with Update 3 packages vxbxhub VSHubCore.msi' 'Error 0x8007010a: Failed to verify signatureof payload: vsvshubcore' I am running Windows 7 Enterprise Service Pack 1.
I have disabled anti-virus, verified the iso checksum is correct, and ran as administrator. Still the same problem. Any help is appreciated.
Sara, I gave this information to my system administrator and we were able to install successfully! It turns out we were missing 3 Microsoft Root Authority certificates that were required. It seems that these problems could be detected and reported. It would be nice if the installer could tell us that a certificate was missing instead of telling us that a setup file doesn't exist when it does exist. Very confusing.
It could also tell us to download using the /layout switch if needed. Here is what we needed to do to get everything isntalled: 1) Run the setup with a /layout switch on a connected maching to download the offline version. On the isolated machine: 2) Presetup requirements (Windows Update, IE11, Turn off AntiVirus, run as admin, etc) 3) Install the following root certificates (others may be needed, these are only the ones we were missing) -Microsoft Root Authority 2010 -Microsoft Root Authority 2011 -Microsoft Time-stamp PCA 2010 4) Copy the 22.5 offline version and install. Thank you for the support! Dear Leodox, Welcome to the MSDN forum. Since you used the ISO to install and meet this error, could you please have a try with the web installer?
Please make sure Windows update already up-to-date to excludes the pending patches blocked the installation. According to the error message “Error 0x8007010a: Failed authenticode verification of payload: c: Visual Studio 2015 with Update 3 packages vxbxhub VSHubCore.msi”, if you directly run the VSHubCore.msi and see if the same issue happens or not.
Meanwhile, please have a look at the following methods: 1. Please run the Fixit tool: Automatically repair issues that block program installation or removal because of corrupted registry keys.
Run the command: sfc /scannow in the elevated command prompt to scan for corruptions in Windows system files and restore corrupted files. 3. This could appear if the “Certificate Revocation List” checking is switched off. To switch on “Certificate Revocation List” checking, please change the value of the following registry key: HKEYCURRENTUSER Software Microsoft Windows CurrentVersion WinTrust Trust Providers Software Publishing State The value should be 23c00. State REGDWORD 0x00023c00 So once the CRL checking is turned on and the certificate of the application that we are installing is valid, the install is successful. If the issue still persists, I need your help to the VS installation log. Please use to gather the installation logs. After using it, you will find vslogs.zip under%temp% folder.
Please upload the file to and share the link here. Best regards, Sara We are trying to better understand customer views on social support experience, so your participation in this interview project would be greatly appreciated if you have time. Thanks for helping make community forums a great place. Sara, Thanks for the quick reply! I can't try the web-installer. Unfortunately, my machine is isolated and can not be connected to the internet. Also, we do not have automatic update capability, so I am running a clean install of Windows 7 Enterprise SP1 with no automatic-updates.
Currently VS2012 and.Net 4.5 and 4.6.1 are installed and working well. I installed IE11 as well prior to attempting to install VS2015. If I run VSHubCore.msi directly, it apears to run fine with no errors.
1) I have downloaded and ran MicrosoftFixit-portable.exe and it gives an error 'code 80072EE7: Error trying to contact the server.' 2) I ran sfc /scannow and it completed with no error found. 3) I check the CRL registry entry and it was already correctly set to 0x23c00.
If you need the logs, is there an offline utility to gather them, or a way to do it manully? It is complicated to export files, so any support without logs is appreciated, but I can export them if required. Dear Leodox, Thank you for your update. Since your computer cannot connect to the internet network, I recommend you download an offline installer not the ISO file to install, you need to create an offline installation layout by using a machine that is connected to the Internet, what's more, please see here: About the installation logs, it locates under the%temp% folder and you can clean up%temp% then re-run the installer, the name of the installation log file is similar like 'ddvs.' , find the latest log file and upload it to the and share the link here.
Best regards, Sara We are trying to better understand customer views on social support experience, so your participation in this interview project would be greatly appreciated if you have time. Thanks for helping make community forums a great place.
Sara, I was finally able to get the /layout version downloaded and transferred to my isolated machine. I have verified the size of the download as referenced in this post: My downloaded size is a little bit larger that the one you mentioned in that post because it has a few extra files. When I run the setup and choose a default install, it fails with the same errors as mentioned in this post: The files are all where they should be.
I doubt it is an invalid download because I verified the checksum and I can run vsHubCore.msi directly and it runs fine by itself. The log has the same 0x8007010a error as mentioned in my first post and I also saw a 0x800b010a error. I have gone through all the same steps mentioned multiple times in all of these posts - download with /layout, turn off anti-virus, run as admin, sfc /scannow, check the CRL, update windows, etc. The results are the same on several different machines and freshly imaged VMs. Clearly, there is another problem with the offline installer. I will attempt to get the logs collected and posted for you, but I may not be able to due to the nature of the isolated network. Please help us get this prduct installed.
Dear Jon, I doubt it is an invalid download because I verified the checksum and I can run vsHubCore.msi directly and it runs fine by itself. The checksum is display as expected? After you directly run the vsHubCore.msi successfully, please re-run the VS installer again. Please share the latest installation log if you can, it will help us to analysis this issue. Best regards, Sara We are trying to better understand customer views on social support experience, so your participation in this interview project would be greatly appreciated if you have time.
Thanks for helping make community forums a great place. Click HERE to participate the survey. Is there a way to get the checksum of the /layout downoload? I verified the checksums of all the ISO's I downloaded prior to downloading with /layout and they all checked correctly. All downloads have given the same errors, so it seems to be someting other than a failed download.
After I run vsHubCore.msi directly, I re-run the VS installer and it continues past that point, but then it fails again with the same error on the BuildTools.msi file. When I run BuildTools.msi directly, it tells me I need to run BuildTools.msi from a setup program. I can not get past that point. If I disconnect my machine from our local network, then the installer gives a warning that it is missing security certificates and may not install correctly. Could this be a security certificate problem? Is there information regarding which certificates are requried for installation? Thanks for the continued support!
Dear Jon, Refer to the missing security certificates information when you met, I found this issue may be related to the security certificate updates that are required to install some Visual Studio components cannot be applied to this computer, please have a look at this: Please try the following methods: Method 1: Make sure that you are on a computer that is connected to the Internet. In some cases, Visual Studio can programmatically retrieve and apply the required certificate updates so that the affected features can be successfully installed. Method 2: Check the Group Policy setting on your computer that controls automatic certificate updates. To check the setting, open the Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc). From the Local Group Policy Editor, under Computer Configuration, expand Administrative Templates, expand Internet Communication Management, and then click Internet Communication settings. The setting that controls automatic certificate updates is Turn off Automatic Root Certificates Update.
For Visual Studio to automatically retrieve and apply the required certificates, this option should be set to Disabled. Note We recommend that you contact your system administrator before you change any Group Policy setting.
Method 3: If Methods 1 and 2 do not resolve the issue, you can also try to manually install the required certificate updates. For information about how to obtain Windows update root certificates, see. Best regards, Sara We are trying to better understand customer views on social support experience, so your participation in this interview project would be greatly appreciated if you have time. Thanks for helping make community forums a great place. Click HERE to participate the survey.
Sara, I gave this information to my system administrator and we were able to install successfully! It turns out we were missing 3 Microsoft Root Authority certificates that were required.
It seems that these problems could be detected and reported. It would be nice if the installer could tell us that a certificate was missing instead of telling us that a setup file doesn't exist when it does exist.
Very confusing. It could also tell us to download using the /layout switch if needed. Here is what we needed to do to get everything isntalled: 1) Run the setup with a /layout switch on a connected maching to download the offline version. On the isolated machine: 2) Presetup requirements (Windows Update, IE11, Turn off AntiVirus, run as admin, etc) 3) Install the following root certificates (others may be needed, these are only the ones we were missing) -Microsoft Root Authority 2010 -Microsoft Root Authority 2011 -Microsoft Time-stamp PCA 2010 4) Copy the 22.5 offline version and install. Thank you for the support! Hi mdivk, Welcome to the MSDN forum.
Since this thread is ended up for several months, could you please create a new thread for your issue and it will also convenient for us to trace and research your issue, thank you for your understanding. Best regards, Sara MSDN Community Support Please remember to click 'Mark as Answer' the responses that resolved your issue, and to click 'Unmark as Answer' if not. This can be beneficial to other community members reading this thread.
If you have any compliments or complaints to MSDN Support, feel free to contact.
The Microsoft Trusted Root Certificate Program (“Program”) supports the distribution of qualifying root certificates in Microsoft Windows and other Microsoft Products and Services. This page describes the Program’s general and technical requirements, including information about how a Certificate Authority (CA) can contact Microsoft to request inclusion into the Program. This document lists the details and requirements for the Program. Certification Authorities ('CAs') that are current members of the Program are listed.
How Root Certificate Distribution Works. Starting with the release of Windows Vista, root certificates are updated on Windows automatically. When a user visits a secure Web site (by using HTTPS SSL), reads a secure email (S/MIME), or downloads an ActiveX control that is signed (code signing) and encounters a new root certificate, the Windows certificate chain verification software checks the appropriate Microsoft Update location for the root certificate. If it finds it, it downloads it to the system. To the user, the experience is seamless. The user does not see any security dialog boxes or warnings. The download happens automatically, behind the scenes.
37 Nyc Department of Youth Community Development Dycd jobs available on Indeed.com. Program Director, Site Manager, Youth Coordinator and more! This new funding climate requires organizations to adopt a new set of fundraising activities focused on diversified funding streams and a strong internal culture of philanthropy. Through a capacity building contract, PASE provides professional development, resources, and best practices in fund development for organizations. DYCD employment programs help youth between the ages of 14 and 24 gain valuable work experience. Beacon Programs School-based community centers serving children age 6 and older and adults. 129 Dycd jobs available on Indeed.com. Youth Coordinator, Youth Specialist, Training Specialist and more! Cornerstone Programs. Cornerstone Programs provide engaging, high-quality, year-round programs for adults and young people. Programs are located at 94 New York City.
Certificate Authority Intake Process. In order to begin the process to be included in the Program, a CA must fill out the application located at and email the completed form to. This will begin the onboarding process, outlined below:.
Microsoft will review the application, and may request additional documentation from the CA to determine if the CA meets the Program requirements and whether, in Microsoft’s judgment, the CA’s inclusion into the program will benefit Microsoft’s customers. Microsoft will provide preliminary Program approval to the CA and a deadline by which all materials must be completed and returned to Microsoft, for the CA to in included in the next release (typically every four months). Upon receipt of preliminary approval from Microsoft, the CA will need to engage an auditor to complete the necessary audit. See, for more information about the Program’s audit requirements.
When the audit is complete, the CA must send the following materials to Microsoft:. A copy of all of the roots that the CA wishes to have Microsoft include in the Program in.cer file format (contained in a.ZIP file). Test URLs for each root, or a URL of a publicly accessible server that Microsoft can use to verify the certificates. An electronic copy or URL that contains the most recent audit attestation for each of the roots the CA wishes to have Microsoft include in the Program. Information to complete and sign the Program contract, including:. The name, email address, phone number, and job title of the person who will sign the Program contract.
A second contact’s name, email address, and phone number. The company’s principle place of business (street address). The company’s place of incorporation (country or state/province).
Microsoft will send the Program contract to the CA to sign and return to Microsoft. Upon receipt of the completed contract, Microsoft will add the CA to the next release, if the CA has returned the materials by the deadline provided to the CA. Otherwise, Microsoft will add the CA’s roots to a subsequent release.
All CAs in the Program must comply with these Continuing Program Requirements. If Microsoft determines that a CA is not in compliance with the below requirements, Microsoft may exclude the CA from the Program. The CA must provide to Microsoft evidence of a Qualified Audit (see ) for each root, non-limited sub-root, or cross-signed non-enrolled root, before conducting commercial operations and thereafter on an annual basis. The CA must assume sole responsibility for ensuring that all non-limited sub-roots and cross-signed, non-enrolled roots meet the Program Audit Requirements. The CA must provide Microsoft with updated Program contact information every July, November, and March, as well as upon Microsoft’s request. The CA must designate and disclose to Microsoft at least two contacts to be responsible to receive communications from Microsoft, including contact names, email addresses, and business and mobile phone numbers.
The CA must disclose its full PKI hierarchy (non-limited sub-roots, cross-signed non-enrolled roots, intermediates, EKUs, certificate restrictions) to Microsoft on an annual basis, including certificates issued to CAs operated by external third parties. More about the depth of sub-CA (define as all below root). CAs must inform Microsoft at least 120 days before transferring ownership of an enrolled root to another entity or person, and obtain Microsoft’s written consent prior to transfer, which consent may be granted or denied in Microsoft’s sole discretion.
CAs must agree to receive notices by e-mail and must provide Microsoft with an email address to receive official notices. If Microsoft sends an email that is undeliverable, Microsoft will send notices to the last-known address for the CA. CAs must agree that notice is effective when Microsoft sends the email or the letter.
CAs must agree that Microsoft may contact the CA’s customers who Microsoft believes may be substantially impacted by Microsoft’s decision to remove a root from the Program. CAs may not enroll a root into the Program that is intended to be used internally within an organization (i.e. Enterprise CAs). CAs must publicly disclose all audit reports for non-limited sub-roots. If a CA uses a subcontractor to operate any aspect of its business, the CA must assume responsibility for the subcontractor’s business operations. Program Technical Requirements.
Root certificates must be x.509 v3 certificates. The CN attribute must identify the publisher and must be unique. The CN attribute must be in a language that is appropriate for the CA’s market and readable by a typical customer in that market. Basic Constraints extension: must be cA=true. Key Usage (if present) must be keyCertSign and cRLSign only. Root Key Sizes must meet the requirements detailed in “Key Requirements”. New roots must be valid for at least eight (8) years from the date of submission.
Root certificates must expire no more than 25 years after the date of application for distribution. The CA may not issue new 1024-bit RSA certificates. All certificates issued from a root certificate must support either the CRL distribution point extension or AIA containing an OCSP responder URL. Private Keys and subject names must be unique per root certificate; reuse of private keys or subject names in subsequent root certificates by the same CA may result in random certificate chaining issues. CAs must generate a new key and apply a new subject name when generating a new root certificate prior to distribution by Microsoft.
All roots that are being used to issue new certificates, and which directly or transitively chain to a certificate included in the Program, must either be limited or be publicly disclosed and audited. Government CAs must restrict server authentication to.gov domains and may only issues other certificates to the ISO3166 country codes that the country has sovereign control over (see section III for the definition of a “Government CA”). Government CAs that also operate as commercial, non-profit, or other publicly-issuing entities must use a different root for all such certificate issuances (see section III for the definition of a “Commercial CA”).
Intermediate CA certificates must meet the requirements for algorithm type and key size for Subordinate CA certificates listed in Appendix A of the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements, which can be found. Intermediate CA certificates under root certificates submitted for distribution by the Program must separate Server Authentication Code Signing and Time Stamping uses. This means that a single issuing CA must not be used to issue both server authentication and code signing certificates. A separate CA must be used for each use case. Rollover root certificates, or certificates which are intended to replace previously enrolled but expired certificates, will not be accepted if they combine server authentication with code signing uses unless the uses are separated by application of Extended Key Uses (“EKU”s) at the intermediate CA certificate level that are reflected in the whole certificate chain.
End-entity certificates must meet the requirements for algorithm type and key size for Subscriber certificates listed in Appendix A of the CAB Forum Baseline Requirements. For Server Authentication certificates, Windows will stop trusting SHA1 certificates on 1 January 2017. This means any SHA1 SSL certificates issued before or after this announcement must be replaced with a SHA2 equivalent by January 1, 2017. Note Microsoft will not require CAs to replace SHA1 Server Authentication certificates but will no longer trust SHA1 certificates after January 1, 2017. CAs must use the following OIDs in the end-entity certificate: DV 2.23.140.1.2.1; OV 2.23.140.1.2.2; EV 2.23.140.1.1.; IV 2.23.140.1.2.3; EV Code Signing 2.23.140.1.3; Non-EV Code Signing 2.23.140.1.4. End-entity certificates that include a Basic Constraints extension in accordance with IETF RFC 5280 must have the cA field set to FALSE and the pathLenConstraint field must be absent.
Key Requirements. The CA must have a documented revocation policy and must have the ability to revoke any certificate it issues.
Deleted July 2015. CAs that issue Server Authentication certificates must support the following OCSP responder requirements:. Minimum validity of 1 day; Maximum validity of 1 week; and. The next update must be available at an interval of ½ of the validity period. For example, if the maximum validity is 48 hours the next update must be available 24 hours before the current item expires. All certificates issued from a root certificate must support either the CRL distribution point and/or AIA containing an OCSP responder URL.
The CA must not use the root certificate to issue end-entity certificates. The CA must operate their own Time Stamp Authority. The Time Stamp Authority must comply with RFC 3161, “Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP).” D. Code Signing Root Certificate Requirements. In order to qualify for the code signing EKU, new root certificates submitted for distribution by the Program must be separate Server Authentication from Code Signing and Time Stamping uses at the intermediate certificate level.
New code signing root certificates must support the SHA2 hash algorithm. Root certificates that support code signing use will be removed from distribution by the Program 10 years from the date of distribution of a replacement rollover root certificate, or a shorter deadline on request of the CA. Root certificates that remain in distribution to support only code signing use beyond their algorithm security lifetime (e.g. RSA 1024 = 2014, RSA 2048 = 2030) will be limited to code signing use only. Root certificates will be removed from distribution by the Program without regard to any unexpired end entity certificates issued from them, according to the following deadlines:. Server Authentication certificates: CAs must begin issuing new certificates using only the SHA-2 algorithm after January 1, 2016.
Windows will no longer trust certificates signed with SHA-1 after January 1, 2017. Code signing certificates: CAs must begin issuing new certificates using only the SHA-2 algorithm after January 1, 2016. For developers targeting Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008 CAs will be allowed to continue issuing SHA-1 certificates. Time-stamping certificates: CAs must begin issuing new certificates using only the SHA-2 algorithm after January 1, 2016. For developers targeting Windows Vista and Windows Server 2008, CAs will be allowed to continue issuing SHA-1 certificates. Windows will not enforce a policy on time-stamping certificates.
OCSP signatures: Microsoft requires CAs to start issuing new OCSP signatures using only the SHA-2 algorithm after January 1, 2016. Windows will no longer trust OCSP responses that use SHA-1 for their signature if the corresponding certificate had the Must Staple extension after January 1, 2016. Time-stamp signature hashes: CAs must start issuing new time-stamp signature hashes using only the SHA-2 algorithm after January 1, 2016. For developers targeting Windows Vista and Server 2008, CAs will be allowed to continue issuing SHA-1 time-stamps. EKU Requirements. CAs must provide a business justification for all of the EKUs assigned to their root certificate. Justification may be in the form of public evidence of a current business of issuing certificates of a type or types, or a business plan demonstrating an intention to issue those certificates in the near term (within one year of root certificate distribution by the Program).
Microsoft will only enable the following EKUs:. Server Authentication =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1. Client Authentication =1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2. Secure E-mail EKU=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4. Code Signing EKU=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3. Time stamping EKU=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8.
Encrypting File System EKU=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.4. Document Signing EKU=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.10.3.12 F. Windows 10 Kernel Mode Code Signing (KMCS) Requirements. Windows 10 has additional requirements to validate kernel-mode drivers, which are appropriately signed by Microsoft and a CA.
CAs who wish to become authorized for kernel mode code signing must complete the steps below. The CA must send an email to with:. Microsoft will evaluate whether the CA complies with all of the Program’s requirements. A zipped copy of the.cer file of the root that the CA will use kernel-mode code signing; and.
The policy OID that the CA will use to identify kernel-mode code signing. Microsoft will evaluate whether the CA complies with all of the kernel mode code signing requirements. Microsoft will send the CA the appropriate contract materials. Upon receipt of the signed contract materials, Microsoft will add the CA to the list of authorized kernel-mode code signing participants. Technical Best Practices. Though not required by Microsoft, the following represents what Microsoft believes to be the best practices that each CA should follow.
Microsoft recommends that each CA have an established communication channel to its customers. For example, if Microsoft were to notify the CA that Microsoft was disabling weak file hashes, the CA should have a method to notify its customers to use the updated signtool.exe file. Because root certificates will be removed without regard to any unexpired end entity certificates issued from them, the CAs should plan to cease issuing end entity certificates for uses besides code signing such that those certificates expire according to these root removal guidelines.
While Windows will not enforce specific policies on Secure Email certificates, Microsoft recommends that CAs start issuing new Secure Email certificates using the SHA-2 algorithm. Security Incident Response Requirements. “A compromise” means a direct or indirect incident, affecting either the CA or any of the CA’s sub-roots ooor cross-signed, non-enrolled roots, that results in an actual or potential degradation of the security stature of the PKI, which includes hardware, software, or physical building issues. “Security Incident” or “Incident” means any of the following that occur at the CA or a sub-CA:. A Private Key compromise. A mis-issued certificate. A known or reasonably knowable, publicly reported compromise.
Any physical compromise of the CAs infrastructure (e.g. Physical access control failure, building compromise, or a failure of the HVAC in the data center). Any other issue that Microsoft identifies as calling into question the CA’s integrity or trustworthiness. “Exceptional Circumstance(s)” means an Incident(s) the causes Microsoft to reasonably believe that the PKI is compromised; and such Incident affects the security posture of a large number of Microsoft’s customers.
Microsoft’s Rights in the Event of an Incident. In the event of a Security Incident, Microsoft may at its sole discretion, do any of the following:. In an Exceptional Circumstance, immediately revoke any certificate the CA or any sub-CA has enrolled in the Program, otherwise it may revoke any certificate after providing 7 days’ advance notice to the CA. Microsoft may take action including, but not limited to marking files signed by compromised certificates as malware, blocking web navigation to sites served with compromised Server Authentication certificates, preventing delivery of mail signed by compromised Secure Email certificates, etc. Request that the CA make specific reports at a periodic interval to be determined by Microsoft. Specify a due date for the CA to submit to Microsoft a final Security Incident report. Communicate with affected third parties.
Require the CA to employ, at the CA’s expense, a third-party investigator to investigate the Security Incident and prepare the final Security Incident report. Disqualify any Qualifying Audit and require the CA to perform a new Qualifying Audit at the CA’s sole expense. Microsoft’s Responsibilities in the Event of a Security Incident. In the event that Microsoft exercises any of the rights described above, Microsoft will:. Notify the CA, in writing, of its intentions 7 days prior to Microsoft’s action, except under Exceptional Circumstances, in which case Microsoft will make reasonable efforts to communicate with the CA prior to taking action; and.
Allow the CA to propose an alternate course of action, in which case, Microsoft will consider reasonable alternatives but reserves the right to reject such proposals if it deems the proposed course of action not to be in its customers’ best interest. CA Responsibilities in the Event of an Incident. In the event of a Security Incident, the CA must:.
Notify Microsoft as soon as is practical but no later than 24 hours from the time of the Security Incident by (a) completing the form located at and (b) sending the completed form to [email protected]. The form requires the following information (if known at the time):. Who detected the Incident.
If available, the identity of the perpetrator(s) whose actions caused the Incident. When the CA discovered the Incident. Where the Incident occurred. The Roots and, if requested by Microsoft, end-user certificates that were affected by the Incident, if any. The sub-CAs that were affected by the Incident, if any. What the CA believes to be the underlying cause of the Incident. What remedial measures the CA has taken or will take that the CA believes will address the underlying cause of the Incident.
Microsoft Authenticode Tm Root Authority
Any other information the CA believes to be appropriate. Any other information requested by Microsoft when it responded to the initial notification. At Microsoft’s request, the CA must provide a list of all certificates that were mis-issued as a result of the Incident. At Microsoft’s request, the CA must provide Microsoft with periodic reports at an interval specified by Microsoft. If Microsoft does not make a specific request within 24 hours of an initial notification, the CA must provide reports to Microsoft as it discovers any new information.
The CA must provide a final Security Incident report to Microsoft that includes:. A list of certificates and domains involved in the Incident. How did the CA detect the Incident? If the CA did not detect the Incident, who did and why did the CA not detect it?. If the CA has reported conflicting information, why?. Detailed description of the Incident. Details about what infrastructure was compromised.
Details about how the infrastructure was compromised. A detailed timeline of events. The CA’s interpretation of who perpetrated the Incident. Log files (appendix only). Was the Incident detected by the CAs normal operation?
If it was not, the CA must explain why. If the Incident involved vulnerability, was the vulnerability discovered in the most-recent audit? If yes, then provide information explaining how the vulnerability was remediated. If the vulnerability was not remediated, the CA must provide information about the reason for not doing so. What changes to the CP/CPS policies will the CA make?. Detailed description of how the Incident was closed. If requested by Microsoft, a complete investigative and technical report of the compromise.
How to: Create Temporary Certificates for Use During Development. 4 minutes to read. Contributors. In this article When developing a secure service or client using Windows Communication Foundation (WCF), it is often necessary to supply an X.509 certificate to be used as a credential.
The certificate typically is part of a chain of certificates with a root authority found in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store of the computer. Having a certificate chain enables you to scope a set of certificates where typically the root authority is from your organization or business unit. To emulate this at development time, you can create two certificates to satisfy the security requirements. The first is a self-signed certificate that is placed in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store, and the second certificate is created from the first and is placed in either the Personal store of the Local Machine location, or the Personal store of the Current User location. This topic walks through the steps to create these two certificates using the, which is provided by the.NET Framework SDK. Important The certificates the Certification Creation tool generates are provided for testing purposes only. When deploying a service or client, be sure to use an appropriate certificate provided by a certification authority.
This could either be from a Windows Server 2003 certificate server in your organization or a third party. By default, the creates certificates whose root authority is called 'Root Agency.' Because the 'Root Agency' is not in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store, this makes these certificates insecure. Creating a self-signed certificate that is placed in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store enables you to create a development environment that more closely simulates your deployment environment. For more information about creating and using certificates, see.
For more information about using a certificate as a credential, see. For a tutorial about using Microsoft Authenticode technology, see. To create a self-signed root authority certificate and export the private key. Use the MakeCert.exe tool with the following switches:.n subjectName. Specifies the subject name.
Microsoft Authenticode Root Authority Expired
The convention is to prefix the subject name with 'CN = ' for 'Common Name'. Specifies that the certificate will be self-signed.sv privateKeyFile. Specifies the file that contains the private key container.
For example, the following command creates a self-signed certificate with a subject name of 'CN=TempCA.' Makecert -n 'CN=TempCA' -r -sv TempCA.pvk TempCA.cer You will be prompted to provide a password to protect the private key. This password is required when creating a certificate signed by this root certificate. To create a new certificate signed by a root authority certificate. Use the MakeCert.exe tool with the following switches:.sk subjectKey. The location of the subject's key container that holds the private key.
If a key container does not exist, one is created. If neither of the -sk or -sv options is used, a key container called JoeSoft is created by default.n subjectName. Specifies the subject name. The convention is to prefix the subject name with 'CN = ' for 'Common Name'.iv issuerKeyFile. Specifies the issuer's private key file.ic issuerCertFile. Specifies the location of the issuer's certificate. For example, the following command creates a certificate signed by the TempCA root authority certificate with a subject name of 'CN=SignedByCA' using the private key of the issuer.
Makecert -sk SignedByCA -iv TempCA.pvk -n 'CN=SignedByCA' -ic TempCA.cer SignedByCA.cer -sr currentuser -ss My Installing a Certificate in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities Store Once a self-signed certificate is created, you can install it in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities store. Any certificates that are signed with the certificate at this point are trusted by the computer.
For this reason, delete the certificate from the store as soon as you no longer need it. When you delete this root authority certificate, all other certificates that signed with it become unauthorized. Root authority certificates are simply a mechanism whereby a group of certificates can be scoped as necessary. For example, in peer-to-peer applications, there is typically no need for a root authority because you simply trust the identity of an individual by its supplied certificate. To install a self-signed certificate in the Trusted Root Certification Authorities. Open the certificate snap-in.
For more information, see. Open the folder to store the certificate, either the Local Computer or the Current User. Open the Trusted Root Certification Authorities folder. Right-click the Certificates folder and click All Tasks, then click Import. Follow the on-screen wizard instructions to import the TempCa.cer into the store. Using Certificates With WCF Once you have set up the temporary certificates, you can use them to develop WCF solutions that specify certificates as a client credential type. For example, the following XML configuration specifies message security and a certificate as the client credential type.
To specify a certificate as the client credential type. In the configuration file for a service, use the following XML to set the security mode to message, and the client credential type to certificate. In the configuration file for a client, use the following XML to specify that the certificate is found in the user’s store, and can be found by searching the SubjectName field for the value 'CohoWinery.' For more information about using certificates in WCF, see.NET Framework Security Be sure to delete any temporary root authority certificates from the Trusted Root Certification Authorities and Personal folders by right-clicking the certificate, then clicking Delete.